Causal Nets, Interventionism, and Mechanisms by Alexander Gebharter

Causal Nets, Interventionism, and Mechanisms by Alexander Gebharter

Author:Alexander Gebharter
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Springer International Publishing, Cham


5.3.1 Problem (i): Causes One Cannot Intervene on

The first problem is quite well known. It arises due to the bi-conditional in the definitions of total, direct, and contributing causation (Definitions 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9, respectively). For a variable X to be a cause∗ of another variable Y in a given system S it is required, according to these definitions, that there is an i-expansion of S containing an intervention variable for X w.r.t. Y such that Y can be influenced by this latter intervention variable’s taking certain ON-values. The problem is that there may be causal systems for which there are no expansions containing the required intervention variables. Take the scenario discussed in Sect. 5.2.1 as an example: We know that the position of the moon X is a cause of the motion of the tides Y in causal system S with variable set V = { X, Y }. But Woodward’s (2003) theory would lead to the false result that it is not. (See the discussion about possible interventions in Sect. 5.2.) Even if one is not satisfied by the argumentation in Sect. 5.2 that possible interventions should be understood as “physically possible” and insists on interpreting them as logically (or conceptually) possible, like Woodward does, the problem remains: There are still causes one cannot possibly intervene on, not even in the weak sense of logical or conceptual possibility. Examples of such causes are species, race, sex, etc. (cf. Glymour 2004, pp. 789f).

In my view, the best solution to the problem should not consist in tinkering with the notion of a possible intervention, but rather in modifying the principles which determine the connection of causation to manipulation and control. It is quite reasonable to assume that control of Y by manipulating X indicates a causal connection between X and Y, but why should any such causal relationship between X and Y require the possibility of affecting Y by means of manipulating X? For some variables there simply are no (physically or even conceptually) possible interventions. According to this consideration, one could simply drop the only-if part in Definitions 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9:

Modification 5.1

Drop the only-if part of Definitions 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9 .



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